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Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales: An Examination Of
Retroactivity And The Effect Of The Illegal
Immigration Reform And Immigrant Responsibility
Act
By Brooke Hardin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are of Hispanic descent, but have been living in the
United States for the better part of 40 years. Your home is in the
heartland of America, where you have a wife and a child. You also
own a successful trucking business, which you consider to be a
tremendous accomplishment due to your humble beginnings in
Mexico. You are the embodiment of the American dream.
Now imagine being pulled away from your home, family and
business and being shipped back to Mexico, notwithstanding the fact
that you have lived as a model citizen for many decades. Also, due
to the application of a new immigration law, you are unable to
request judicial review of the deportation, even though you have
cultivated such intimate ties to the nation.
This is the unfortunate story of Humberto Femandez-Vargas.1 In
the country illegally, he was deported in the 1970's, and re-entered
the country covertly where he remained undetected until 2001 2
Once discovered by immigration authorities, the original 30-year-old
deportation order was reinstated pursuant to new immigration reform,
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Pepperdine University School of Law. Ms. Hardin
would like to thank her parents, Dennis and Mary-Ellen Hardin, and her fianc6,
Brian Jarvis, for their years of support and encouragement.
1. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2427 (2006).
2. Id.
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1996 ("IIRIRA"). 3 Part of the new act is a provision that eliminates a
re-entrants ability to challenge the original order - something our
history of immigration law has never seen - regardless of the
immigrant's changed circumstances or other possible avenue for
discretionary relief.
4
However, due to the fact that Fernandez-Vargas re-entered in the
early 1980's, he argued that application of the new immigration act
would be impermissibly retroactive; instead, he argued that the
Supreme Court should apply the more immigrant-friendly
Immigration and Nationality Act which allowed for discretionary
review of previously executed deportation orders.5 The Supreme
Court, however, found no impermissive retroactive application to
Femandez-Vargas, and the previous deportation order was reinstated
without the opportunity for further procedural relief.6
Therefore, due to the precedent set in Fernandez- Vargas v.
Gonzales, all aliens who re-enter the country after being deported -
no matter the date of re-entry - are automatically and irrefutably
subject to the prior deportation order, with no possibility of appeal or
judicial review of the order.7
In this note I will discuss a general background of the various
laws that led up to the creation of IIRIRA, as well as the impact this
legislation had on deportation proceedings in the United States. I
will also discuss the Supreme Court's analysis of this law and its
application to immigrants who have illegally re-entered the country
before the effective date of the Act. I will conclude with a critique of
the Court's reasoning and the effect this decision will have on the
future of deportation proceedings in the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
In the earliest stages of our country's history, few restrictions
were placed on immigration. 8 However, around the turn of the 19th
3. Id.
4. See 8 U. S. C. § 123 1(a)(5) (2005).
5. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427.
6. Id. at 2434.
7. See § 123 1(a)(5); see also Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2434.
8 Elwin Griffith, The Transition Between Suspension of Deportation and
Cancellation of Removal for Nonpermanent Residents Under the Immigration and
century, the President was given the power to deport any alien who
posed a threat to the welfare of American citizens. 9 Yet even with
this power, a deportation candidate still had the ability to convince
the President that he posed no such danger; if he succeeded, the alien
would be allowed to remain in the country if his behavior conformed
to accepted social norms. 0 Since that early time, aliens have been
limited in their ability to convince American officials that their tenure
in this country should not be cut short, as immigration/deportation
law has been made stricter.
The issue here, however, does not concern the nation's power to
or reasons for deporting aliens - instead, the issue concerns which
law to apply to an alien who illegally re-enters the country after
being subject to a deportation order." The statute that determined
Petitioner's fate was actually the culmination and reformation of
three laws with deportation re-entry provisions: the Internal Security
Act of 1950, which immigration provisions were reformed by the
Immigration and Nationality Act two years later, and again reformed
in 1996 by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act. 12 With each new law, the scope of deportation
was broadened and the procedures for discretionary judicial view
were tightened. 13 Below is a general synopsis of each statute.
A. The Internal Security Act of 1950
Congress enacted the Internal Security Act in 1950 in an attempt
to control what the nation perceived as a growing Communist threat
Nationality Act: The Impact of the 1996 Reform Legislation, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 79,
79 (1999).
9. Id.
1O. Id. at 80.
11. See Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2425. As will be discussed in some
detail, petitioner Fernandez-Vargas disputed the potential retroactive effect in
applying the current statute, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996. Id. at 2427. He argued that because he re-entered the
country before the implementation of this statute, the more lenient prior statute
should be applied. Id. As will be discussed, the Supreme Court did not agree. Id.
at 2430.
12. See Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2426-27 (2006).
13. Id.
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within its borders. 14 The Act grew out of specific findings regarding
the supposed nature of the Communist party, and the effect of
Communist immigration to the United States.'
5
The Internal Security Act also amended previous rules regarding
deportation.' 6 Under the Act, the Attorney General had the authority
to detain and deport certain undesirable aliens, focusing primarily on
those aliens who were also members of the Communist party.' 7  In
fact, numerous Supreme Court cases upheld the Attorney General's
14. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 335 (1993). The text of the Act clearly
depicts what degree of threat Congress considered Communists to be. Section 2 of
the Act states:
There exists a world Communist Movement which, in its origins,
its development, and its present practice, is a world-wide
revolutionary movement whose purpose it is, by treachery,
deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmental or otherwise),
espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed
necessary to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in the
countries throughout the world through the medium of a world-
wide Communist organization. The establishment of a
totalitarian dictatorship in any country results in the suppression
of all opposition to the party in power, the subordination of the
rights of individuals to the state, the denial of fundamental rights
and liberties which are characteristic of a representative form of
government, such as freedom of speech, of the press, of
assembly, and of religious worship, and results in the
maintenance of control over the people through fear, terrorism,
and brutality.
Internal Security Act of 1950, § 2(l),(2) (1946).
15. Id. at n. 25. Congress determined the Communist party to be,
[a]n organization numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and
ruthlessly disciplined... awaiting and seeking to advance a
moment when the United States may be so far extended by
foreign engagements, so far divided in counsel, or so far in
industrial or financial straits, that overthrow of the Government
of the United States by force and violence may seem possible of
achievement.
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 535, n.21 (1952) (quoting § 2(15) of the
Internal Security Act of 1950)).
16. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2426.
17. Id. at 335.
power to deport an alien solely based upon his status as a
Communist, on the grounds of preserving national security. 1
8
The Act also allowed for immediate reinstatement of previously
executed deportation orders. 19  However, these provisions only
applied to certain types of aliens: namely, those labeled as
"anarchists" or "subversives., 20 Therefore, all other aliens that were
not directly considered a threat to national security were processed
under normal deportation rules. 2 1 It was not until the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1965 that the class of citizens subject to
reinstatement of deportation orders was broadened.22
B. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965
The laws of deportation were once again reformed in 1965 with
the emergence of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").23
However, compared with the current state of deportation laws, the
INA was still relatively tame. The decision to deport an alien must
have been made while mindful of an alien's inherent due process
rights, and must have been based upon "reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence."24 Additionally, the standard of review was set
above the civil "preponderance of the evidence standard" and was
anchored by the Supreme Court at "clear and convincing."25
Furthermore, each alien had the ability to appeal a deportation order
18. See generally Carlson, 342 U.S. at 524. Courts have interpreted that the
Attorney General may use his discretion in deportation cases in order to protect the
nation from "active subversion." INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights,
502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991).
19. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2426.
20. Id. The act also applied to criminals, prostitutes, and procurers or other
immoral persons. 8 U. S. C. § 156(c) (1946).
21. Id. Therefore, aliens not considered anarchists or subversives who re-
entered the country were not subject to the previously issued deportation order. Id.
22. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2426.
23. See 8 U. S. C. § 1252(f) (1994) (also known as INA § 242(f)).
24. Kirk L. Peterson, "Final" Orders of Deportation, Motions to Reopen and
Reconsider, and Tolling Under the Judicial Review Provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 439, 446 (citing STEVEN C. BELL, PLI LITIG.
& ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK, BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 13 (No. 373
1989)).
25. Peterson, supra note 24 at 446.
Fernandez-Varzas v. GonzalesSpring 2007
296 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-1
to Board of Immigration Appeals, and could even petition to have the
order reviewed in a federal appellate court.
26
As mentioned previously, the INA of 1965 expanded the rules
regarding the reinstatement of deportation orders against aliens who
re-entered the country illegally.27 The new text of the rule stated that
"any alien" who re-enters after being deported - before or after 1952
- shall be issued the same deportation order as the one previously
executed.28 But once again, this law only applied to certain aliens,
despite the use of the term "all."'29 Furthermore, if an alien was
subject to the renewal of a previous deportation order, he could
petition for some discretionary relief from the order.30 The order was
by no means applicable to all illegal re-entrants, and was by no
means a procedural dead end.31 Not until the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 were an illegal re-
entrant's procedural due process rights brought to a halt.32
C. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996
IIRIRA was signed into law by President Clinton on September
30, 1996.33 Labeled by some observers as "draconian," IIRIRA
sought to reduce the swell of illegal immigration into the United
States.34 The two most notable provisions of the act are the
provisions for expedited removal as well as the criminal prosecution
26. Id.
27. See § 1252(f) (also known as INA § 242(f)).
28. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2426.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See § 123 1(a)(5). As will be discussed, under the new law, once an alien
has been afforded the due process of an original deportation hearing, no additional
hearing, nor the opportunity for discretionary review of the prior order, is given.
Id.
33. David M. Grable, Personhood Under the Due Process Clause: A
Constitutional Analysis of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 820, 821 (1998).
34. Grable, supra note 33 at 821.
for aliens who re-enter, or attempt to re-enter, the United States after
having been previously deported.35
The constitutional questions surrounding the new law are
substantial: are the alien's due process rights violated by his inability
to appeal a determination of admissibility?36 Furthermore, can this
unappealable determination be used as the basis for subsequent
criminal prosecution? 37
IIRIRA rests the power of an alien's continued tenure in the
United States in the hand of just one immigration official. 38  This
lone official may and "shall order the alien removed from the United
States without further hearing or review." 39 Not only is the decision
given to only one immigration official, these expedited deportation
orders are neither administratively nor judicially reviewable. 40 Thus,
an alien forcing deportation has no recourse, no matter how grave the
consequences may be.4'
Although many people may be unaware of this fact, all persons,
from all nations across the globe, are afforded protection under out
Constitution the minute they step foot on American soil.42 Aliens
cannot be deprived of procedural due process solely due to their
status as legal or illegal.43 Obviously, though, under IIRIRA,
35. Id.
36. Id. at 822.
37. Id. Some argue that these provisions are diametrically opposed to Supreme
Court precedent establishing aliens' constitutional rights in criminal trials. Id. The
main concern stems from the fact that the deportation order is made by a single
immigration inspector - and yet this one inspector's opinion is subject to no
judicial review. When one contemplates the grave issues at stake (such as the
presence of dependent family members within the United States), it is relatively
easy to understand why such an individualized determination makes many
observers and critics uneasy about the new law.
38. See INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(5).
39. See id.
40. Grable, supra note 33 at 826.
41. Id.
42. Peterson, supra note 24 at 445. This immigration scholar asserts that that
all persons, whether they entered the United States legally or illegally, are to be
afforded the protections under the due process clause of the Constitution. Id.
43. Id.
Spring 2007 Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales
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Congress decided that only very limited due process is required to
fulfill this Constitutional requirement for deportable aliens.
44
An alien subjected to expedited deportation may find that his only
option is to covertly re-enter the country. However, the alien now
does so at his own peril, as IIRIRA attaches the power of criminal
prosecution to aliens who have been subject to previous deportation
orders.45 Of course, in the past, aliens who violate deportation orders
have been subjected to criminal prosecution; however, only with
IIRIRA is an attack on the validity of that prior deportation order
prohibited.46  Therefore, this lone immigration official's
determination is subject to no review, and can also subject the alien
to harsh criminal consequences.
47
As seen in the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Immigration
and Nationality Act as promulgated in 1965, aliens who re-entered
after the issuance of a valid deportation order may have been
deported pursuant to the same deportation order; however, this only
applied to certain aliens, and some discretionary review was still
available. 48  However, with JIRIRA, all aliens who illegally re-
44. See generally § 123 1(a)(5).
45. 8 U. S. C. 1326(a). This section states that violators may be fined under
Title 18, and/or imprisoned for up to two years. Id. Therefore, violation of a
deportation order is punishable as a felony. Id.
46. Grable, supra note 33 at 827. Therefore, in the past, during a criminal
prosecution, the alien was allowed to argue that the prior deportation order was
invalid. However, IIRIRA prohibits collateral attacks on deportation orders, even
though the deportation order was never reviewable. Thought of another way, the
individual immigration officer's determination of the alien's deportation
conclusively and irrefutably establishes a critical element of a subsequent criminal
offense. Id. Hence, the constitutional concerns arise.
47. Id. The text of the rule is as follows:
(5) Reinstatement of removal orders against aliens illegally
reentering. If the Attorney General finds that an alien has
reentered the United States illegally after having been removed
or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the
prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is
not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not
eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act, and the
alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the
reentry.
§ 123 1(a)(5).
48. See supra note 29.
-pin 207Frade-V a v.Gnae
entered after being deported were immediately re-deported with
absolutely no opportunity for discretionary relief.49 Basically, once
an alien is deported, that is the end - he cannot re-enter and seek
discretionary relief, no matter the degree of hardship, and may in fact
face stiff criminal penalties. 50 However, which law is to be applied
when the alien illegally re-enters prior to the enactment of IIRIRA?
Are they subjected to IIRIRA's strict provisions, or the only
appropriate law to apply the more lenient Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965? Enter, Fernandez- Vargas...
III. FACTS
Humberto Femandez-Vargas, a Mexican citizen, first immigrated
to the United States in the 1970's.5 Based upon various immigration
violations, he was deported in 1981.52 He attempted, several times,
to re-enter the country, but was once again deported on each of those
unsuccessful attempts. 53 However, in 1982, Femandez-Vargas again
re-entered the country and remained undetected in Utah for almost 30
years. 54  While in Utah, he founded and operated a trucking
business.55
In 1989, he fathered a son, who by law is a United States
citizen. 56 In 2001, Fernandez-Vargas married the mother of his son,
49. See supra note 47.
50. § 1231(a)(5).
51. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The United States Constitution provides that all people born within any
American state or territory are legal citizens:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U. S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Spring 2007 Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales
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who is also a legal United States citizen.5 7 Soon thereafter, his wife
filed a relative-visa petition on her husband's behalf.58 Based upon
this petition, Fernandez-Vargas petitioned to adjust his immigration
status to that of legal permanent resident.59
Unfortunately for Femandez-Vargas, the filing of these petitions
alerted immigration authorities that he was illegally in the country
subsequent to the execution of a previous deportation order.60 In
November of 2003, the Government began proceedings to reinstate
the 1981 deportation order, and denied him the possibility of
discretionary review to adjust his status to lawful permanent
resident. 61 He remained in custody for 10 months, and then was
removed to Juarez, Mexico in the fall of 2004.62
Prior to being removed, Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth District to review the reinstated
deportation order. 63 He argued that because he re-entered the country
before IIRIRA came into effect, his deportation proceeding should be
governed by the prior, more immigrant-friendly INA.64 If the INA
were the governing statute, then Fernandez-Vargas would be able to
apply for review of his status, which potentially could be changed to
that of lawful permanent resident. 65 In sum, Petitioner argued that
application of IIRIRA is impermissibly retroactive.
66
57. Id.
58. Id. See also 8 U. S. C. §§ 1154(a), 1151(b) (2000 ed.); see also
Fernandez- Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 883.
59. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427; see also 8 U. S. C. § 241(a)(5).
60. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427.
61. Id. The statute under which the Government was operating was the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 8 U.
S. C. § 241(a) (1994 ed.).
62. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427..
63. Id.
64. Id. For a discussion of the INA, see supra notes 23-32 and accompanying
text.
65. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text. In fact, if the INA were the
controlling statute, Fernandez-Vargas' petition would likely have been successful
due to his marriage to a United States citizen. Id.
66. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427-28. Statutes are regarded as
impermissibly retroactive when their application would "impair the rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, of impose
new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Landgraf v. USI Film
Fernandez-Vargas also relied heavily upon Prado Hernandez v.
Reno from the Ninth Circuit to support his argument that he should
be allowed to change his residential status. 67 There, the district court
held that an application for adjustment of status, if submitted prior to
the reinstatement of the prior deportation order, was not a "request
for relief' under the language of IIRIRA. 68  The application for
adjustment cannot be considered a request for relief because there
was not yet an action to seek relief from. 69 Therefore, although the
alien may be deportable under IIRIRA, that does not make him
ineligible for adjustment of status if the alien's petition was
submitted prior to the deportation order reinstatement. 70
The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's reliance upon Prado,
on the grounds that "the district court apparently ignored the fact that
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). As a general rule, "a statute shall not be given
retroactive effect unless such construction is required by specific language or by
necessary implication." Id. at 2428, citing United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & T.R.
Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3 (1926).
67. Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 885 (2005) (discussing Prado
Hemandez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1037(W.D. Washington 1999)).
68. Prado Hernandez, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-42.
69. Id. at 1041.
70. Id at 1041-42. The Ninth Circuit has ruled similarly in other cases, yet
based upon different principles. For example, in Castro-Cortez v. INS, the court
relied on three main arguments in deciding that IIRIRA was not to be applied to
pre-enactment reentries:
First, the court noted that Congress eliminated the retroactivity
language from the statute and stated that "Congress's decision to
remove the retroactivity language from this part of the statute
provides strong support for the conclusion that it did not intend
that the revised provision be applied to reentries occurring before
the date of the statute's enactment." Second, the court concluded,
by negative implication, that, because Congress had specified in
several other sections of the IIRIRA whether the sections would
apply retroactively, the failure to provide for retroactive
application.. .indicated that Congress did not intend for that
section to apply retroactively. Third, the court stated that
"Congress is deemed to enact legislation with Landgraf's 'default
rule' [against retroactivity] in mind.. Accordingly, silence
provides useful evidence as to intent for the first step of
Landgraf's two-part inquiry.
Fernandez-Vargas, 394 F.3d at 887 (quoting Sarmiento Cisneros v. U. S. Att'y
Gen., 381 F.3d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotingCastro-Cortez v. INS, 239
F.3d 1037, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Fernandez-Vargas v. GonzalesSpring 2007
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the alien was not deportable but deported and was ineligible for relief
from that prior deportation under the reinstatement statute.",71 Thus,
the alien's application for adjustment in status necessarily occurred
after the original deportation order was executed.72
Furthermore, the appellate court reasoned that simply because
IIRIRA does not expressly say whether the reinstatement provision
applies to all aliens does not mean that Congress unambiguously
intended that the statute not apply to pre-enactment reentries. 73 In the
absence of clear congressional intent, the court must look at whether
the statute has retroactive effect. 74 Here, Petitioner did not petition
for change in status until 2001. 75 IIRIRA became effective in 1997;
hence, Fernandez-Vargas had no "protectable expectation" of being
able to adjust his status.76 Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that
application of IIRIRA had no impermissibly retroactive effect against
Femandez-Vargas, and upheld the reinstated deportation order.
77
71. Fernandez- Vargas, 394 F.3d at 887.
72. Id. It is clear that this circuit is placing more emphasis on the date of the
original deportation, while the Ninth Circuit placed its emphasis on the date of the
reinstatement proceedings (essentially the second deportation order).
73. Id. at 890.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 891.
It would be a step too far to hold that simply by re-entering the
country, Fernandez created a settled expectation that if he did
marry a U.S. citizen, he might then be able to adjust his status
and defend against removal. "Inchoate plans to act in the future,
even when made in anticipation of the legal consequences of
those future actions, do not convey the type of settled expectation
that retroactivity analysis seeks to protect.
Id. at 891 (quoting Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 16). However, the Eighth
Circuit held that if an alien was married before IIRIRA became effective in 1997,
then IIRIRA is not applicable because "long-standing INS practice created a
reasonable expectation that he could defend against later deportation or removal by
seeking a discretionary adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident," and thus
IIRIRA creates an additional burden upon the alien. Id. at n. 11 (quoting Alvarez-
Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2002)).
77. Id. The court relied upon Landgraf in determining that there was no
impermissive retroactive effect. Id. at 887. In Landgraf the Supreme Court
examined whether application of a rule that allowed forjury trials in Title VII cases
was meant to have retroactive application. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 286. There,
However, not all federal circuits have decided this issue in the
same way as the Tenth Circuit; others determined that the IRA is the
proper statute to apply to immigrants who re-entered prior to
IIRIRA's enactment.78  Therefore, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in this case in order to settle the dispute regarding the
potential retroactive application of IIRIRA to other immigrants
similarly situated to Fernandez-Vargas. 79
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion of the Court, as written by Justice Souter,
begins with a thorough analysis of the meaning of retroactive
application, and how courts tend to view questions of retroactivity. 80
The Court breaks this daunting task into a three-step analysis.8' First,
courts should look to whether Congress has specifically provided in
the text of the statute for retroactive application. 82 In the absence of
specific language, the court will use the "normal rules of
construction" in an attempt to reach a "comparatively firm
conclusion" about the temporal reach of the statute. 83 If the second
attempt is to no avail, then the court should ask whether application
to the objecting party would affect the party's substantive rights,
the Court held that retroactive application was contrary to the Congressional intent
of the Act, and thus was not applicable to Plaintiff's claim. Id.
78. Fernandez- Vargas, 394 F. 3d at 888. Two circuits, the Ninth and the
Sixth, have held that § 241(a)(5) does not apply to aliens who re-entered before the
effective date. Id. (citing Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 676-77 (Cal. App. 6 2001);
Castro-Cortez239 F.3d at 1050-53). Eight other circuits have held that IIRIRA, in
some situations, is applicable. Id. Even those eight circuits are divided on the issue
whether an alien's marriage to a citizen renders the statute impermissibly
retroactive due to the impossibility of adjusting the alien's status. Fernandez-
Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at n.5.
79. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427.
80. Id. at 2427-28.
81. Id. at 2428.
82. Id. Specific language allowing for retroactive application is obviously the
ideal, as that leaves no room for judicial debate.
83. Id.
Spring 2007 Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales
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liabilities, or duties on the basis of prior conduct. 84 If the answer is
yes, then the court will apply a presumption against retroactivity 8 5
Unfortunately for all parties involved, the Supreme Court clarifies
immediately that the IHRIRA is silent on the issue of temporal reach,
and thus this problem cannot be easily disposed. 6
The majority structures its analysis of this case by listing each of
the contentions the petitioner makes, and then by systematically
dismissing their validity.8 7 Therefore, this analysis will be organized
by listing Fernandez-Vargas' points of argument, and then by
discussing the majority's response.
".. Femandez-Vargas first argues that Congress specifically did not
intend for IIRIRA to apply to all aliens who re-entered the country
prior to IIRIRA's effective date.8 8  This proposition is based upon
the interpretive rule of negative implication: because a temporal
reach provision was specifically excluded from the statute, it must
have been Congress' intent for the rule to only have prospective
application. 89 Supporting this negative implication argument is the
fact that the prior INA statute included a provision for retroactive
application, yet the new IIRIRA contained no such provision.90 The
84. Id.
85. Id. Notice, therefore, that the Court's reasoning does not begin with a
presumption of retroactivity. Some may be under the impression that any court
will enter a question of retroactivity with a pre-existing disfavor for retroactive
application of a statute, but in fact, the reasoning begins with no bias one way or
the other.
86. Id. at 2428. The Court states, "[n]eedless to say, Congress did not
complement the new version of § 241(a)(5) with any clause expressly dealing with
individuals who illegally reentered the country before IIRIRA's April 1, 1997,
effective date, either including them within § 241(a)(5)'s ambit or excluding them
from it." Id.
87. See generally Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427-34.
88. Id. at 2428.
89. Id. at 2429. The analytical tool of negative implication has been
recognized and utilized in the past by the Supreme Court. See Brewster v. Gage,
280 U.S. 327, 337 (1930) (holding that "deliberate selection of language...
differing from that used in the earlier Acts" can indicate that that the change was
intended).
90. Id. Section 242(0 of the previous statute applied to "any alien [who] has
unlawfully reentered the United States after having previously departed or been
deported pursuant to an order of deportation, whether before or after June 27, 1952,
on any ground described in.. .subsection (e)." § 1252(0. Femandez-Vargas argued
Court, however, does not believe that the issue can be disposed of
that simply.91
The majority responds by criticizing Petitioner's reading of the
text of the previous statute, and that the previous before-or-after
clause was in an entirely unrelated section of the INA.92 The
temporal reach provision referred not to the alien's illegal re-entry
but instead to the alien's original deportation. 93  Therefore, the
provision is only relevant to the date the alien left the country, and
not to the date he illegally re-enters.94
Furthermore, the majority felt that Petitioner's -negative
implication argument went against the legislative intent in drafting
the new legislation.95  IIRIRA was meant to expand the scope of
deportation order reinstatement. 96 If omission of the before-and-after
clause showed an intent to apply § 241(a)(5) only to deportations
after IIRIRA's effective date, the result "would be a very strange
one": all those who departed the country before IIRIRA's effective
date but re-entered after it would be exempt from the rule. 97 Such an
application would hardly expand the scope of application of prior
deportation proceedings. 98  Thus, the majority dismisses this
argument as meritless. 99
that because the previous before-or-after clause made retroactive application clear,
its later elimination shows the Congress no longer intended the statute to apply to
pre-enactment re-entrants. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2429.
91. Id. The majority promptly responds, "the clues are not that simple." Id.
92.Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The majority continues, "if [the before-and-after clause's] omission
from the new subsection (a)(5) is significant, its immediate significance goes to the
date of leaving this country, not to the date of illegal return." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The majority reaches this conclusion by looking at the position the
before-and-after clause had in the previous INA. Because the temporal reach
clause referred to the date of deportation and not to the date of re-entry, then
application of the provision to the new IIRIRA would do the same. This, the
majority feels, is contrary to legislative intent and just does not make any sense.
See id.
98. Id.
The point of the statute's revision, however, was obviously to
expand the scope of the reinstatement authority and invest it with
something close to finality, and it would make no sense to infer
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The majority then turns to Petitioner's second argument: because
the statute is silent as to temporal reach, the Court should apply the
presumption against retroactive application to statutes that are
ambiguous as to that issue.1°° However, the majority finds two flaws
with this argument. First, the majority feels that applying the
presumption against retroactivity this early in the analysis process
"puts the cart before the horse."'' If the presumption against
retroactivity was always applied in the absence of explicit
congressional intent, then no such statute could ever be applied
retroactively. 02
The - second flaw in Femandez-Vargas' argument is a general
failure to account for the new statute's other provisions on temporal
reach. 10 3 Although IIRIRA may be silent as to the temporal reach §
241(a)(5), the new amendments make specific reference to which
aliens are subject to criminal or civil penalties. 10 4 The new statute
specifically provides that expanded criminal penalties are only to be
applied to re-entrants who re-entered after the statutes effective
date. 10 5 If Congress did not intend for IIRIRA to apply to all illegal
that Congress meant to except the broad class of persons who had
departed before the time of enactment but who might retum
illegally at some point in the future.
Id.
99. Id. "We therefore need not entertain Femandez-Vargas's argument that the
provision's drafting history indicates that the language was eliminated
deliberately." Id. at n.7.
100. Id. at 2429. Petitioner urged the court to apply the "longstanding
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of
the alien." Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001)). This essentially
would impose the presumption against retroactive application to statutes that do not
specifically prescribe for such. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2429.
101. Id.
102. Id. If this were the case, then there would be no need for the three-step
inquiry process. Simply, in the absence of specific language, a statute may never
be applied retroactively. This, the majority feels, is simply too broad of a
proposition. Id.
103. Id. From the other references, the majority feels that one can draw a
negative inference that subsection (a)(5) was meant to apply to re-entries before its
effective date. Id.
104. See IIRIRA § 324(c).
105. See id.
re-entrants, no matter the date of re-entry, why would there be a need
to put in such a caveat? 10
6
After the majority decides that the language of the rule is simply
too ambiguous to infer any Congressional intent as to temporal reach,
it makes an interesting logistical jump: whether Congress intended
the statute to apply to pre-enactment re-entries is moot, because
applying the statute to aliens such as Fernandez-Vargas simply has
no adverse retroactive effect anyway.10 7 With an argument that
essentially creates fodder for dissent, the majority asserts that the text
of IIRIRA applies to Fernandez-Vargas not because of his date of re-
entry, but because he chose to remain after the new statute became
effective. 0
8
Supporting this argument is the fact that Fernandez-Vargas could
have taken advantage of the lead time before IIRIRA became
106. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2429. However, the majority qualifies
that statement:
The point here is not that these provisions alone would support
an inference of intent to apply the reinstatement provision
retroactively, for we require a clear statement for that... But these
provision do blunt any argument that removal of the before-or-
after clause suffices to establish the applicability of § 241(a)(5)
only to posteffective date reentries. . . . With such a variety of
treatment, it is just too hard to infer any clear intention at any
level of generality from the fact of retiring the old before-or-after
language from what is now § 241(a)(5).
Id.
107. Id. at 2431. Furthermore, the majority points out that Femandez-Vargas
has absolutely no argument supporting the proposition that application of IIRIRA
to him somehow cancels previously vested rights. Id. at n. 10. "The forms of relief
identified by Femandez-Vargas as rendered unavailable to him by § 241(a)(5)
include cancellation of removal.. . adjustment of status... and voluntary departure.
... These putative claims to relief are not 'vested rights,' a term that describes
something more than inchoate expectations and unrealized opportunities. Id.
108. Id. The majority states:
This facial reading. . .show[s] that the application suffers from
no retroactivity in denying Fernandez-Vargas the opportunity for
adjustment of status as the spouse of a citizen of the United
States.. . the text of that provision itself, showing that it applies
to Fernandez-Vargas today not because he reentered in 1982 of at
any other particular time, but because he chose to remain after
the new statute became effective.
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effective. 0 9  Thus, the rule has no significant retroactive effect,
because Fernandez-Vargas could have prevented the adverse affect of
the statute by applying for change in status during the interim
period. "' No right was taken from him; it only imposed a time
period in which he could enforce the rights he re-entered the country
under. "'
In further analysis that requires several readings to comprehend,
the majority asserts that the predicate act for application of §
241(a)(5) is the act of remaining in the country, and not the date of
re-entry.'1 2 Therefore, by remaining in the country after IIRIRA's
109. Id.
110. Id. To support this conclusion, the majority draws the reader's attention
to its holding in INS v. St. Cyr. See supra note 100. There, the alien was a lawful
permanent resident who pled guilty to an aggravated felony charge after entering
into a plea agreement with the District Attorney. INS v. St. Cyr533 U.S at 293.
When he entered his plea, the law allowed him to seek a waiver of deportation at
the discretion of the Attorney General. Id. However, between the plea and the
deportation proceedings, IIRIRA came into effect and repealed the provision for
discretionary relief, which converted deportation from a mere possibility to an
absolute certainty. Id. at 293. There, the court had to determine whether its
holding in Landgraf barred application of the new law which eliminated the
possibility of discretionary relief. Id. Because application of the new law would
attach a heightened penalty onto his plea agreement, there the court held that
retroactive application of IIRIRA was inappropriate. Id. "The answer was that
converting deportation from a likely possibility to a dead certainty would add such
a burden, and application of the new law was accordingly barred. Fernandez
Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2431.
111. Fernandez Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2431.
112. Id. The convoluted language is as follows:
While the law looks back to a past act in its application to "an
alien [who] has reentered... illegally," the provision does not
penalize an alien for the reentry (criminal and civil penalties do
that); it establishes a process to remove him "under the prior
order at any time after the reentry." Thus, it is the conduct of
remaining in the country after entry that is the predicate action;
the statute applies to stop an indefinitely continuing violation that
the alien himself could end at any time by voluntarily leaving the
country. It is therefore the alien's choice to continue is illegal
presence, after illegal reentry and after the effective date of the
new law, that subjects him to the new and less generous legal
regime, not a past act that he is helpless to undo up to the
moment the Government finds him out.
Id. (citations omitted).
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effective date, the alien implicitly concedes to the rule."'3  The
statutes purpose, then, is to put an end to "indefinitely continuing
violations," and should apply to all those illegal re-entrants who have
remained in this country past the enactment of IRIRA, regardless of
their date of illegal re-entry. 114
The detail that hurts Petitioner's argument the most, says the
majority, is the fact that there was a substantial delay in the
enactment of IIRIRA. 115 IIRIRA became law on September 30,
1996, yet only became effective 180 days later." 6 Therefore, illegal
re-entrants such as Fernandez-Vargas had a "grace period" between
the tougher regime that was to follow. 1 7 During those six months,
113. See id.
114. Id.
115.Id.
[B]ut in fact his [Femandez-Vargas'] position is weaker still. For
Femandez-Vargas could not only have chosen to end his
continuing violation and his exposure to the less favorable law,
he even had an ample warning that the new law could be applied
to him and ample opportunity to avoid that very possibility.
Id.
116. Id. IIRIRA "became effective and enforceable only 'on the first day of
the first month beginning more than 180 days after' IIRIRA's enactment, that is,
April 1, 1997." Id.
117. Id. Interestingly, one of the ways that the majority says illegal re-entrants
can avoid IIRIRA's harsh effect is by leaving the country all together. Although
this is definitely a way to avoid being subject to IIRIRA's consequences, this is
almost a comical statement - by the majority's own argument, illegal aliens should
leave the country to avoid being deported from the country. There is something
circular about this argument. However, the majority does recognize the harsh
consequences of leaving the country: "To be sure, a choice to avoid the new law
before its effective date or to end the continuing violation thereafter would have
come at a high personal price, for Fernandez-Vargas would have had to leave a
business and a family he had established during his illegal residence." Id. Justice
Stevens brings up this very point in his dissent, which the majority addresses:
Justice Stevens thus argues that reimposing an order of removal
to end illegal residence is like imposing a penalty for a completed
act. . . . But even on his own analysis, Fernandez-Vargas
continued to violate the law by remaining in this country day
after day, and Justice Stevens does not deny that the United
States was entitled to bring that continuing violation to an end.
Id. at n.13. Therefore, the majority falls back on the unfortunate fact that
Fernandez-Vargas made the personal decision not to apply for change of status
during the grace period. Id. at 2431.
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the majority says Petitioner could have availed himself of two
options: either end his illegal presence by returning to Mexico, or
marry the mother of his son and apply for adjustment of status while
the more lenient law was still in effect."' At least then, says the
majority, he would have had a credible claim for detrimental reliance
on the old law, which could have been honored by applying the
presumption against retroactivity. 119
In its closing statements, the majority takes issue with the fact
that Petitioner seeks to continue his illegal activity ad infinitum. 120
To the Court, IIRIRA was enacted for the very purpose of ending
indefinite terms of illegal presence in this country. 12 1  Because
IIRIRA's temporal reach applies not to the date of illegal re-entry but
to violations that continue after its enactment, there is no
impermissive retroactive effect against Ferndanez-Vargas.122
Petitioner's own failure in not applying for change of status during
the grace period also means he has no credible argument for
detrimental reliance on the new law.' 23  Therefore, the Court of
Appeals decision was affirmed, and IIRIRA was correctly applied to
Fernandez-Vargas. 124
118. See supra note 107.
119. Id. One might wonder how the Supreme Court can honestly expect an
illegal alien in our country to keep abreast of changes in immigration law, so that
he would have actual knowledge of the pending enactment of IIRIRA. However, it
is well known that ignorance of the law is no excuse, and the majority is absolutely
correct in that Femandez-Vargas could have applied for a change in status during
the interim period. In fact, the majority notes that many illegal re-entrants did take
advantage of the 6 month grace period. See id. at n.12.
120. Id.
What Fernandez-Vargas complains of is the application of new
law to continuously illegal action within his control both before
and after the new law took effect. He claims a right to continue
illegal conduct indefinitely under the terms on which it began,
and entitlement of legal stasis for those whose lawbreaking is
continuous. But '[i]f every time a man relied on existing law in
arranging his affairs, he were made secure against any change in
legal rules, the whole body of our law would be ossified forever.'
Id. (citations omitted).
121.Id. at 2431.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2434.
124. Id.
B. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, as delivered by Justice Stevens, takes issue with the
majority's two main propositions: first, that IIRIRA was meant to
apply to pre-enactment re-entries, and second, that the revised statute
has no retroactive effect.125 He reiterates the well-founded historical
precedence against retroactive application of statutes, which strives
not to create harsher punishments for actions already completed.
126
The laws that were in effect when Fernandez-Vargas re-entered the
country would have rewarded his subsequent behavior: by starting a
business, marrying a United States citizen and fathering a child in
this country, Petitioner would have been a likely candidate for
discretionary review of his residential status.1 27  Therefore, in the
face of an ambiguous statute, the majority errs by not keeping with
the long-standing tradition of disfavoring retroactivity. 1
28
As discussed previously, Fernandez-Vargas argued that the
removal of the before-or-after clause that was contained in the
previous statute signified an intention to prevent any retroactive
application of the new IIRIRA. 129 However, the majority disagreed
with Petitioner's analysis of the before-or-after clause, and decided
that the old clause referred not to the date of re-entry, but only to the
date of original deportation. 130  Justice Stevens agrees with the
majority's analysis, but argues that it instead strengthens Fernandez-
Vargas' argument.131 Because the old before-or-after clause refereed
to pre-enactment deportations but not to pre-enactment re-entries,
Congress did not intend for the law to apply to pre-enactment re-
entries. 132 As such, the Court should infer that Congress' intent for
125. Id. at 2435 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2429.
130. Id.
13 1. Id. at 2435 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id. Also, Justice Stevens argues that the "traditional presumption against"
retroactivity supports this argument. Id. However, the majority disagrees that
there is a general presumption against retroactivity, as that would "put the cart in
front of the horse." See supra note 92. Only by going through the three step
process can you fall back on a presumption against retroactivity. Id.
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the new law remained unchanged, and IIRIRA should not affect
those who re-entered before its 1997 effective date.
133
The dissent not only believes that the majority fails to give
IIRIRA its most rational interpretation, but also errs in its conclusion
that the statute has no retroactive effect. 134  Of course Fernandez-
Vargas could have chosen to leave the country before IIRIRA's
effective date, but for every additional day he remained in the
country, he increased his chances of being granted discretionary
relief.135  Under the previous INA, an alien became eligible for
discretionary residency review when he remains in the country for
not less than seven years, and when he develops ties to the United
States that would make his deportation an extreme hardship.
136
133. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2435 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
dissent argues:
In 1996, when Congress enacted the current reinstatement
provision, it drafted a version of the statute that, like its 1950
predecessor, was silent as to its temporal reach. If we assume (as
the Court does) that the addition of the "before-or-after" clause in
the 1952 statute merely clarified Congress' original intent in
1950 to make the provision applicable to preenactment
departures without authorizing any application to preenactment
reentries, it is reasonable to attribute precisely the same intent to
the Congress that enacted the 1996 statute: as in the 1950 and
1952 versions of the provision, Congress intended the 1996
reinstatement provision to apply to preenactment deportations but
not to preenactment reentries. In sum, our normal rules of
construction support the reasonable presumption that Congress
intended the provision to cover only postenactment reentries.
Accordingly, the 1996 reinstatement provision should not be
construed to apply to petitioner's earlier entry into the United
States.
Id.
134. Id. The Court reached this conclusion by determining that the provision
applies not to the alien's date of re-entry, but to the conduct of remaining in the
country past the new statute's effective date. Id. at 2431.
135. Id. at 2436 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1); see also INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183
(1984) (strictly construing the physical presence requirement). The dissent further
notes that although Fernandez-Vargas became eligible for relief from deportation
after being present for seven years, he could not apply for that discretionary relief
until he was placed in deportation proceedings - only at this point could he raise
his affirmative defense. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2436 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Therefore, if due to his date of re-entry, IIRIRA was not applicable to
Fernandez-Vargas, it was actually in his best interest to remain in the
country for as long as possible, and then to apply for a change in
status. 
13 7
Given the incentives for Fernandez-Vargas to continue his tenure
in the United States for as long as possible, the dissent strongly
argues that the Government should not be allowed to "chang[e] the
rules midgame."' 138 Hardly is there no retroactive effect: Fernandez-
Vargas acted in a way to increase his chances of being granted
discretionary relief under the law that was in effect at the time of his
re-entry into the country, yet he is now being punished for that
behavior.' 39 Because retroactive application of this law would inflict
great hardship on Petitioner, the dissent concludes that the Court
should have applied the presumption against retroactivity. 140
V. CRITIQUE
The issues presented in this case are difficult, and strong
arguments lie on both sides. On the Petitioner's side, it is hard to
accept that application of IIRIRA adds no more burden than would
application of the INA. On the government's side, the fact that
IIRIRA makes it clear that criminal sanctions are only to be imposed
upon those who reentered the country post IIRIRA's effective date
creates a strong argument that IIRIRA was in fact meant to apply to
all illegally reentered aliens.
It is troubling that the majority downplays the Court's long-
standing preference against retroactive application of laws. 141 The
majority cites the three-step process set forth in Landgraf for
137. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2436 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"Moreover, under the pre-1996 version of the reinstatement provision, the longer
petitioner remained in the United States the more likely he was to be granted relief
from deportation. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The dissent also takes issue with the majority's rather flippant
argument that Petitioner could have chosen to leave the country before IIRIRA
became effective: "...he would have imposed upon himself the very same
punishment - the guarantee of removal to Mexico - that he hopes to avoid." Id. at
n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2436 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id.. at 2429.
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determining if a law is to be applied retroactively. 142 Based on this
test, it argues that there is no general presumption against retroactive
application: only after interpreting Congress' intent and establishing
if there is any retroactive effect can the presumption be applied. 1
43
However, in 1811, the issue of retroactivity was addressed in
Dash v. Van Kleeck.'" This decision is still followed to this day.
145
There, Chief Justice Kent stated, "[i]t is a principle of the English
common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its
omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect."'146 This
statement has turned into a presumption against retroactivity that has
been consistently and repeatedly followed by the Supreme Court. 1
47
Interestingly enough, the Court's reasoning in Landgraf seems
completely contradictory to the majority's opinion in Fernandez-
Vargas.148  Obviously, the Court's first task was to determine
whether the statute in issue expressly provided for retroactive
142. See id. The test as set forth in Landgraf is as follows:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events
in the suit, a court's first task is to determine whether Congress
has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress
has done so, of course, there is not need to resort to judicial
default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such
express command, the court must determine whether the new
statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed. If the statute would operate
retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not
govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.
Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280. Stated simply, this test demands (1) a look at
congressional intent, (2) if congressional intent cannot be deciphered, then the
Court must determine if there is any impermissive retroactive intent. If there is an
impermissive effect, then the traditional presumption is to be applied.
143. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
144. 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. 1811).
145. Elizabeth Siemer, The Impact of Landgraf v. USI Film Products: The
Retroactive Application of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 26 CAP.
U.L. REv. 595, 596 (1997).
146. 7 Johns. at 502.
147. Siemer, supra note 145 at 596.
148. See Michelle LeVeque, Rationales for Applying CERCLA Retroactively
After Landgraf v. USI Film Products: Overcoming the Presumption Against
Retroactivity, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 603, 612 (1998).
application. 149 With the absence of express language, the Court had
to determine whether there was "clear congressional intent" to
overcome the presumption of retroactivity.150 That language suggests
that a presumption against retroactivity exists on its own, rather than
as the last step in an analytical process.' 51
Recall that the majority relied strongly on the fact that IRIRA
mentioned that criminal penalties are only to be applied to post-
enactment reentries, thus suggesting that the other provisions were
meant to apply to pre-enactment reentries.' 52  Interestingly, the
Supreme Court in Landgraf rejected a similar line of reasoning. The
losing party in Landgraf argued: "because Congress provided
specifically for prospectivity in two places. . . [the Court] should
infer that it intended the opposite for the remainder of the statute.", 53
The Court's response to this was that Congress knew how to provide
for retroactivity if it intended to, and given the high consequences of
application of the statute, the presumption against retroactivity has
not been successfully overcome. 154 It is strange that the court swayed
so drastically from their prior reasoning when deciding Fernandez-
Vargas.
The majority in Fernandez- Vargas also stated that non-
retroactive application of IIRIRA is contrary to the stated purpose of
the rule. 155 The Court in Landgraf also used the "purpose of the rule"
as an analytical tool in deciding whether retroactive application is
appropriate. 56 There, however, the court found that the "purpose
argument" was "not sufficient to rebut the presumption against
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Landgraf 511 U.S. at 259.
151. Recall the majority's assertion that the presumption against retroactivity
does not stand on its own - you only reach that presumption at the end of the three-
step process. See supra note 85.
152. See supra note 95.
153. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 259.
154. Id. "Given the high stakes of the retroactivity question, the broad
coverage of the statute, and the prominent and specific retroactivity provisions in
the 1990 bill, it would be surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve that
question through negative inferences drawn from two provisions of quite limited
effect." Id.
155. See supra note 88.
156. Landgraf 511 U.S. at 285.
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retroactivity."' 157 In Fernandez- Vargas however, the Court suddenly
gives more weight to the perceived purpose of IIRIRA.
Based upon this, it is strange that the majority makes the assertion
that the Court has no preference for, or presumption against,
retroactive application of laws. Even the Landgraf Court, which this
majority relies so strongly upon, states that the presumption against
retroactivity is a traditional one.15 8 Therefore, because the language
of IIRIRA is relatively unclear as to temporal reach, 159 it is curious
that the court chooses not to rely on its traditional disfavor of
retroactive statutory application.
Perhaps the most troubling statement the majority makes is that
there is no retroactive effect as applied to Fernandez-Vargas. We
know from our judicial history that retroactive application is
inappropriate where it (1) would impair contractual or property
rights, (2) impair a party's rights that have previously vested, (3) add
burdens upon a party that were not upon him at the time of action, or
(4) place new monetary obligations upon a party. 160  At the time
Femandez-Vargas reentered the country, the effective law allowed
illegal immigrants discretionary relief from their previous deportation
orders. Under the INA, the longer the alien remained in the country,
and the more ties an alien created, the more likely they would be
allowed to remain. 161 The law commended those who made good
lives for themselves here.' 62 This is the assumption that Fernandez-
Vargas operated under while in this country, and that is why he
applied for change in residential status after almost 30 years of
behaving as a proper American citizen. 63
Therefore, when Femandez-Vargas entered the country, the law
afforded him a procedural option to petition for residency; yet, when
IIRIRA was enacted almost 30 years later, that procedural option was
taken away from him. 164 Clearly, an added burden was placed upon
157. Id.
158. See supra note 132.
159. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2429.
160. Siemer, supra note 145at 600-01 .
161. See INA § 242(0.
162. See id.
163. See Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427.
164. See generally IIRIRA § 241(a)(5).
him when the opportunity for procedural review was summarily
denied. This is what makes the effect retroactive, whether permissive
or not. Thus, perhaps it would have been easier to accept if the
majority had held that retroactive effect is permissible, rather than
there is no retroactive effect whatsoever.
The majority seems to gloss over the clear due process
implications of applying this law to Petitioner. Although the
Supreme Court has said that aliens subject to deportation or exclusion
from the country may only be entitled to abridged due process rights,
other individual's due process rights are implicated by Petitioner's
deportation. 165 If an alien wishes to apply to adjustment of status, it
is frequently on the grounds of marriage, parentage of children, or
extended tenure within United States' borders.1 66  In Petitioner's
case, the rights of his legal-resident wife and child should also be
considered - if not for legal reasons, then for humanitarian ones. It is
easier to rationalize deportation of an illegal immigrant in this
country, especially with the abridged Constitutional rights afforded to
him. However, a whole family, consisting primarily of American
citizens, is being affected by retroactive application of this rule.
Because the family is not the named petitioner, are they subject to
abridged due process rights as well?
The final point of criticism for the majority's holding is based
upon the well-established immigration principle known as the "Rule
of Lenity."' 167  This rule is easy to understand and easy to apply:
when there are ambiguities in an immigration statute, the statute
should be interpreted in a way most favorable to the alien.168 There
is strong Supreme Court precedent supporting this principle.' 69
It is a tough argument to assert that there are no ambiguities in
IIRIRA, and that the most favorable approach to Petitioner is
165. Jeffrey A. Bekiares, In Country, On Parole, Out of Luck - Regulating
Away Alien Eligibility for Adjustment of Status Contrary to Congressional Intent
and Sound Immigration Policy, 58 FLA. L. REv. 713, 726 (2006).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 725.
168. Id.
169. Id. C.f Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958), in which the Court
held, "we cannot 'assume that congress meant to trench on [an alien's] freedom
beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the
words used."' (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
Fernandez-Vareas v. GonzalesSpring 2007
318 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-1
retroactive application of IIRIRA. But this is exactly what the
majority in effect is arguing - how else can the rule of lenity be
reconciled here?
In fact, the Rule of Lenity is not reconciled - or even considered
- in the majority's holding here. IIRIRA is decidedly ambiguous in
its temporal reach provisions. Considering the fact that the other
points the majority relies upon also seem contradictory to prior
Supreme Court precedence (remember LandgraJ), the Rule of Lenity
should not have been so readily dismissed.
The strongest fact supporting the majority and working against
Fernandez-Vargas is the fact that IIRIRA is not completely silent as
to temporal reach. The statute makes clear that criminal sanctions are
only to be imposed against those who have reentered the country post
IIRIRA's effective date. 170 The implication drawn is that those who
reenter prior to JIRIRA's effective date are not to be criminally
sanctioned, but are still subject to immediate deportation without
discretionary review. Based on this relatively simple qualification,
the majority makes the only conclusion that it reasonably can: that
Congress intended IIRIRA to apply to all illegal aliens, no matter
their date of reentry. 17 1  To be sure, if this small temporal
qualification was not within the statute, the presumption against
retroactivity would likely have been applied here. However, based
upon the Landgraf test, because some congressional intent can be
gleaned from the statute, the presumption against retroactivity need
not be applied. 72
VI. IMPACT
Certainly, IIRIRA was an attempt by Congress to tighten
immigration control mechanisms and serve as a deterrent to illegal
migration to the United States. 7 3 Many felt that the prior INA
regime created fodder for blatant immigration abuses. 174 Due to the
170. See Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2429.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 132.
173. See generally INA § 241(a)(5)
174. Daniel Stein & Terri M. Barton, Immigration Reform Laws: Redefining
who Belongs: Essay: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996: Notable Changes for Restoring Integrity and
fact that it was relatively easy for an illegal alien to successfully
apply for change in status, there was little deterrent for aliens to
illegally migrate to our country. 175 Therefore, IIRIRA was meant to
send a clear message to those contemplating illegal migration: ifyou
enter this country illegally, you will not be rewarded for your
efforts. 176
Proponents of IIRIRA argue that enforcement of the United
States' immigration laws is a necessary element of effective national
security.1 77  The prior INA created many loopholes for illegal
immigrants that essentially rewarded them for ignoring the law, and
the text of IIRIRA serves to close those loopholes and send a
deterrent message instead. 178 This is specifically relevant to those
like Fernandez-Vargas who re-entered the country illegally after
being deported: under the new statutory regime, such aliens can no
longer apply for discretionary review, and thus they are no longer
being rewarded for covertly remaining in the country. 1
79
There are approximately six million illegal aliens currently on
United States soil. About half of those illegal aliens are "EWI's," or
aliens who have entered the states without inspection.18 0 The other
half is comprised of those who have overstayed their temporary
visas. 181 Under the precedent set forth in Fernandez- Vargas, all of
those illegal aliens who have been previously deported - no matter
when they re-entered - are automatically deportable once again,
Credibility to U.S. Immigration Policy, 1 RUTGERs RACE & L. REv. 111, 111-12
(1998). For example, under INA, when an alien violated the terms of his visa or
entered the country illegally, more likely than not the alien could successfully
petition for change in status to that of lawful permanent resident. Id. at 112.
175. Id.
176. See generally id.
177. Id.. "Enforcement of the nation's immigration laws serves to ensure its
national security and welfare.. .Thus, lIRIRA should be viewed as a positive step
toward regaining control of the entire system for regulating immigration." Id.
178. Id. What is meant by "loopholes" is the ability of illegal aliens to readily
petition for change in status to that of lawful permanent resident. Some have
estimated that the success rate of these petitions was up to 50 per cent. Id. at 124.
179. See IIRIRA § 241(a)(5). The longer the alien remained in the country
undetected, the better chance he would have for successfully petitioning for change
in residential status.
180. Stein & Barton, supra note 174 at 120.
181. Id.
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without the appellate review process previously in place.'
82
Therefore, no longer is there a statutory advantage for remaining in
this country undetected; however, there is no benefit in leaving the
country either. 18
3
For those illegal aliens who choose to leave the country on their
own volition, under IIRIRA they may not simply apply for legal
reentry once removed to their country of origin. 184 Instead, they are
barred from legal reentry for a period of time depending on the
duration of their illegal residence in the United States.'
85
Specifically, for those aliens who remain illegally in the country for
between six months and one year, they are barred for applying for
reentry for a period of three years.' 86 For those who remain in the
country for more than one year, such as Fernandez-Vargas, they are
barred for a substantial ten year period. 187
Thus, for aliens like Fernandez-Vargas, who do not face the
possibility of criminal sanctions for their illegal presence, there is
only one viable solution, which Congress certainly did not intend:
remain in the country illegally and covertly for as long as possible,
because one discovered, you will be immediately deported, and
cannot petition for reentry for at least ten years. Even proponents of
IIRIRA recognize this as a problem. The message that IIRIRA sends
to some illegal aliens is to continue to break the law. 188
182. See generally Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct 2422.
183. Like Justice Stevens mentioned, leaving the country on their own volition
is exactly the punishment the aliens were trying to avoid in the first place. And as
we will see, no favorable treatment is given to those illegal aliens who leave the
country on their own volition and then attempt to legally reenter the country.
Perhaps the only benefit is the fact that aliens who re-entered the country after
IIRIRA's effective date can be subjected to criminal penalties for doing so; but for
aliens such as Femandez-Vargas, to whom the criminal penalties do not apply,
there is truly no favorable solution.
184. See 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), (II).
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Stein & Barton, supra note 174 at 122.
Even though the new law toughens the penalty for illegal aliens
who are apprehended, the three and ten-year bar only apply to
illegal aliens who depart from the U.S., either through
Spin 207Frade-Vra v.Gnae
We must then ask ourselves, which solution is better? Under
INA, we would have about half of those illegal aliens in our country
successfully petitioning for legal residency. 89 Of course this creates
more population density, and perhaps encourages more to migrate
illegally, yet also creates a larger tax base.' 90  Under IIRIRA,
although those aliens are still within our borders, they remain illegal,
and thus are never part of the tax-paying population. However, due
to the threat of criminal penalties, perhaps fewer aliens will even
attempt to reenter the country illegally.' 9 1  There are viable
arguments on both sides, and it is difficult to determine which
solution is preferable. One issue, though, was made perfectly clear
by the Supreme Court in this case: if you are an alien similarly
situated to Fernandez-Vargas, stay where you are and don't get
caught!192
deportation or voluntarily, and then seek to re-enter. Thus, the
message to illegal aliens currently residing in the United States is
to remain here and avoid getting caught. After all, the illegal
alien seems to be better off if he continues to reside here, rather
than if he leaves under the penalty of not being able to return for
a number of years.
Id.
189. See supra note 136.
190. However, one could counter this assertion by stating that although there is
technically a larger tax base, a high number of these now legal aliens may petition
for public support, thus creating larger burdens on the taxpayers. Already, though,
illegal immigrants are said to cost $10.5 billion dollars a year - just for
Californians, and just for education, health care, and incarceration expenses. Jerry
Seper, Illegal Aliens Cost California Billions, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at A08.
Educating children of illegal aliens costs $7.7 billion alone. Id. Others counter
that these expenses do not consider the contributions these illegal immigrants make
to the state's economy. Id. After all, they are a source of inexpensive labor for
American businesses. Id. Some would even say that they are the "backbone" of
the multi-billion dollar agricultural industry. Id.
191. See INA § 241(a)(5).
192. Remember that these expedited removal procedures only apply to aliens
who have been previously deported from the country. See Id. Other illegal aliens,
even those who have criminal records, may still be allowed to petition for change
in status. Id. Here are some brief accounts of certain illegal immigrants who were
allowed to remain in our country:
Citing "severe emotional hardship" to her family and American-
born children, a three-member panel of the board halted the
deportation of Haitian nanny Melanie Beaucejour Jean. She had
been convicted in upstate New York of killing an 18-month-old
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VII. CONCLUSION
Immigrants form an integral part of our culture. They work in
every occupation and sector of the economy.' 93 They form strong
familial ties and bonds of friendship with all types of American
residents. 194 The historical beginnings of our nation paint a picture
that embraced immigration and the vibrancy and growth that it can
bring.
Clearly, though, times have changed. Millions of immigrants
remain in our country illegally, and curbing this tide of
baby in her care. "I hit him two or three times with my fist on the
top of his head. I did this to stop him from crying. It did not
work," she told Monroe County, New York, investigators. "I do
not know how long I shook the baby, but I did not stop until he
was unconscious," her police statement said. At the request of
the INS, immigration judge Phillip J. Montante Jr. ordered her
deported back to her native land more than two years ago. But
thanks to a trio of pro-alien, Janet Reno-installed bureaucrats,
Beaucejour Jean continued to enjoy life in America...
Michelle Malkin, The Center for Immigration Studies, The Deportation Abyss, "It
Ain't Over 'Til the Alien Wins, " I available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/backl002.html#19 (citing Jerry Seper, Ashcroft
reviews overturned deportation, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001 at A4).
Finally, Attorney General John Ashcroft overturned this decision.
Another interesting example of a questionable deportation decision is as
follows:
Stephanie Short, a German national, was convicted of
encouraging her 3-year-old daughter to submit to sexual assault
at the hands of her stepfather. He was convicted of sexual
offenses; she was convicted of aiding and abetting the assault of
a minor with the intent to commit a felony. She served three
years of an eight-year sentence and was released on parole. The
INS sought Short's deportation based on her conviction for a
crime of moral turpitude (in other words, a crime that is
inherently base, vile, or depraved). An immigration judge
supported the move. Short appealed to the BIA. In a mind-
boggling decision, the board determined that it "was
inappropriate to consider the husband's conviction record for
purposes of determining the underlying crime of which the
respondent was convicted of aiding and abetting."
Id. (quoting Matter of Short, 20 1. & N. Dec. 136 (BIA 1989)..
193. Beckiares, supra 165 at 714.
194. Id.
undocumented immigration is a daunting task for our administrative
agencies to take on.
With the promulgation of laws like IIRIRA, the government is
attempting to deter illegal immigration by quashing the ideal that the
longer an alien remains in the country undetected, the more likely he
will be granted a change in residential status. 195 The rule set forth in
Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales only serves as a judicial attempt to
reiterate the same ideal. 196
But has the Supreme Court succeeded? The lesson learned here
is that no matter how long you have remained in the country after
being once deported, if caught, you will be summarily deported
pursuant to that original order. 197 Essentially, the message this sends
to all others similarly situated to Humberto Fernandez-Vargas is to
continue to do all they can to remain undetected.
Realistically, the holding here does nothing to curb the tide of
illegal immigration; instead, it simply encourages illegal immigrants
to continue breaking the law. After all, the government no longer
rewards you for cultivating ties to the nation and the people therein -
it simply deports.
195. See generally INA § 241 (a)(5).
196. See generally Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 2422.
197. See generally id.
Spring 2007 Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales

